"This is about the entire community. Adaption to catastrophic events comes in stages over time."
Lt. Col. Sherry Conner
Within days of the Green Ramp disaster Womack Army Medical r, Center and Fort Bragg began the sustained response. Fort Bragg received visiting dignitaries, kept the press informed' honored the dead, and maintained combat readiness. The multiple emergency operations centers worked around the clock to meet the needs of the severely burned paratroopers and their families. Everyone involved in the accident received some form of counseling. Once their specialized burn therapy was completed, the Fort Bragg soldier patients, but for one, returned to Womack for long-term care.
Two days after the tragic accident, and still reeling from the shock, Fort Bragg hosted a visit from President Bill Clinton, who toured the crash site and called on the Green Ramp casualties at Womack. Secret Service agents, a White House photographer, and ten White House media personnel accompanied the president on his visit to the hospital wards. Clinton talked to the injured paratroopers for about one hour and then mingled with the crowd that gathered outside the hosp~tal. At a press conference in front of Womack the president spoke of the soldiers' courage and spirit: "I wish everyone in America could see the faces and the eyes and the spirit of these people. They would realize how fortunate we are to be served by men and women like them. They are so brave and selfless."
Clinton was impressed with the number of soldiers who had received their injuries while helping others. He was touched particularly by the story of the husband and wife team of Lieutenant Altfather and Sergeant Houghton. Presidential attention boosted the morale of everyone patients, families, and staff. They "were deeply moved by his visit," reported public affairs officer Margaret Tippy. The emergency room chief nurse, Major Horoho, believed that the president's v~s~t had helped members of her staff feel recognized for the important job they had done. The presidential visit also emphasized the fact that the disaster "was a nationally publicized event, and that the Fort Bragg community truly belong[ed] to the American community."
The XVIII Airborne Corps chain of command visited the injured paratroopers and their families as well. General Steele, as the 82d Airborne Division commander, involved himself with his wounded troops, calling on them frequently. He spoke of the phenomenal spirit of American soldiers. They
will not lie down and quit . . . even when the Lord deals them a blow like thIs.... They do not give up. Soldiers, with their eyes swollen shut and theIr hands burned and bandaged so you could not touch them, would say to you when you visited: "Airborne all the way, Sir!"
Despite broken legs, a crushed pelvis, and body burns, S. Sgt Roland A. Sonza of the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, came to attention in bed when General Steele pinned master parachutist wings on him. To qualify for the wings, Souza was scheduled to make the last of the required sixty-five jumps on the day of the accident. After the tragic accident the Army waived the requirement for the final jump and awarded him his coveted "Master Blaster" wings. Referring to Souza and the other burned paratroopers, Steele said: "That's the spirit of the people. They're young; they're committed, and they have unique inner strength. Because of their spirit, a lot of them are alive today.
Department of Defense and Department of the Army leaders also visited the disaster victimes. On 26 March Secretaryy of Defense William J. perry and Army Chief of Staff Sullivan called on three at Cape Fear Valley Medical Center and twenty at Womack. They shared words of comfort, which boosted morale. The strong morale of the soldiers, many of whome were anxious to get back to work, impressed Perry. "The kind of spririt they have is incredible. I can't believe how tough they are and how they are bouncing back," he said. The visits of General Douglas J. Reimer of the U.S. Army Forces Command and General Franks of the Training and Doctrune Command, who had lost his leg in Vietnam, also raised the paratroopers' spirit. Fort Bragg public affairs officers arranged press conferences for distinguished visitors.
Fort Bragg's public affairs offices (PAO) continued to keep th press informed. On 26 March the 82d Airborne Division's public affairs officer visited each patient at Womack to learn who would be willin to be interviewed. Three injured soldiers, two male and one female, vol unteered. The media event, held in Colonel Timboe's office, "was a very moving experience," said Margaret Tippy. On the same day Tippy arranged for a press conference at the triage site, with the emergency room staff who handled the mass casualty in attendance, and another at e Fisher House, the home away from home for families of the casualties. Two days later the public affairs officer set up an interview for a local newspaper with Altfather and Houghton. Soon after the arrival of the first twenty Fort Bragg soldier patients at the U. S. Army Institute of Surgical Research (USAISR), the Womack PAO received numerou phone calls from the San Antonio media to obtain information on them Withm a week's time, however, the number of phone calls dropped to about fifty a day.
As coverage of the Pope Air Force Base disaster subsided, Fort Bragg s public affairs officers concluded that, by and large, they were successful in their efforts to disseminate timely information to the press and the community. Some issues, however, remained a question mark, and they hoped that the emergency preparedness committee would consider them at its next meeting. Tippy recommended that in future mass casualty exercises public affairs officers assume the role of reporters to "have an opportunity to see how [the process] works." For example, she sensed frustration in others in trying to obtain an accurate account of patient numbers, but explained that "patient accountability is not a priority when people need to be triaged and treated." Tippy also believed that the hospital staff, "from the newest soldiers to the most seasoned civilians," should know how to handle the news media.
During the crisis Margaret Tippy did not talk with the public affairs officers at Pope Air Force Base, Cape Fear Valley Medical Center, and Highsmith-Rainey Memorial Hospital until 25 March, two days after the accident. "Their lines were always busy," she said. Hence, she suggested the establishment of a communications network among all of the public affairs offices, both civilian and military. "All the major public affairs offices have to dedicate one line as the PAO [internal communications] line.
Despite the shortcomings, the efforts of the Fort Bragg public affairs offices greatly contributed to the success of the entire mass casualty effort, permitting coverage while protecting the privacy of the soldier patients and their families.
The last major event that the news media covered was the memorial service, held on 29 March at Fort Bragg's Ritz-Epps Fitness Center honor the twenty-three deceased paratroopers (see Appendix). The 82d Airborne Division had wanted to hold the service at its memorial near the division museum, but inclement weather forced the ceremony inside. The gym also was preferable since the injured paratroopers, some on hospital gurneys, would be in attendance. The deputy G-2 (intelligence officer), Maj. Thomas Gordon, had designed the inside service carefully, making sure it was a success. 
Twenty-three helmets, twenty-three inverted rifles, and twenty three pairs of boots stood at attention on the Ritz-Epps Fitness Center stage in honor of the fallen soldiers, a traditional Army commemoration for the dead. As each name was called, a paratrooper marched up to the stage, halted in front of a helmet, rifle, and pair of boots; slowly saluted, and marched off. The helmets and boots were given to the families after the ceremony. The rifles were returned to the Fort Bragg arms room.
Among the more than 3,500 people crowded into the Ritz-Epps Fitness Center to honor those who had perished were the wounded survivors of the accident. Some walked in, white gauze covering their burned hands and legs. One hobbled in on crutches. A number were in wheelchairs. Several came on hospital beds or gurneys, pushed forward by nurses, family, or friends. The crowd parted to allow them a better view closer to the front.
Civilian and military dignitaries attended the ceremony, including Secretary of Defense Perry; General Sullivan; General Merrill A. McPeak, the Air Force chief of staff; and General Wayne A. Downing, commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command. The speakers were General Steele, Colonels McChrystal and Austin, and Perry. 
The orators praised the deceased paratroopers' courage and patriotism. Defense Secretary Perry said he came to the ceremony to show the country's appreciation for the sacrifices soldiers were asked to make every day in serving their country. The Green Ramp disaster, he said, "is a harsh reminder of the danger of military service, even in peacetime.... America doesn't ask if the All Americans are trained. It doesn't ask if they're ready. It expects them to be. [The soldiers of the 82d] were doing what America expected of them."
The deceased paratroopers were from fifteen states, ranged in age from nineteen to thirty-five, and held ranks from private to captain. Most were veteran jumpers; one was jumping with his unit for the first time. Some gave their lives to save others.
Military officials shared the stage with the 82d Airborne Division chorus, which sang "Last Full Measure of Devotion" and "Hard To Say Goodbye," among other numbers. From opposite corners of the gym two buglers played a particularly sorrowful rendition of taps, one echoing the other's notes. The emotional ceremony honored the worst peacetime loss of life suffered by the division since World War II.
The memorial service provided closure for many of the 13,500 soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division, but not for the subordinate units that suffered casualties. General Steele had decided that the division, and particularly Colonel McChrystal's 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, should bury its own dead.
It was unusual military procedure to have a battalion bury its own dead in peacetime. But General Steele and his subordinates knew that it was important to give the troops "time to grieve," even though "it was going to take the focus of the battalion for a couple of weeks," said Colonel McChrystal. Hence, the division tried to have the deceased soldier's own platoon or at least company bury him. The burial detail included a firing party, bugler, escort, and pallbearers. McChrystal a ended every funeral in his battalion. A squad leader handed the battalion commander the flag from the casket, and he handed it to the parents. Escorting bodies around the country to their final resting place occupied the division until 9 Apri1.
Even with its forty-four casualties, the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, never lost its combat readiness, "We're trying to deal with it in a very logical sequence," Colonel McChrystal said the day of the accident. "We're a combat unit. We have a mission. Everybody keep your eye on the ball, and we will continue to move forward." The unit was one of the 82d Airborne Division's nine infantry battalions "that rotate responsibility to be first in line for rapid deployment." According to McChrystal, the battalion, despite its losses, could deploy within six hours.
Part of being ready to deploy was knowing how to reorganize at short notice. Soldiers were able to step forward to fill leadership positions at a higher level. "You are always one more deep than you think. Behind every team leader, there's a specialist that can step in, said Colonel Schmader, the 3d Brigade commander. On 24 March replacements started to arrive from the 82d Replacement Detachment, rather than from other division units. Four days later the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, was redesignated DRF-2 (Division Ready Force-2), the Army's second battalion to deploy in an emergency. Despite its losses the battalion was placed on high alert status, "a testament, say its leaders, to their soldiers' indomitable will to `drive on' in the wake of the tragedy."
Colone; McChrystal credited his battalion's ability to the face of tragedy to the support his soldiers received from the chain of command, family groups, and the community, but especially to excellent training. Training had been made as realistic as possible. "The things you learn in training are what you do in war, and that is exactly what happened in the tragedy," said Command Sgt. MaJ. Stevenson Cuffee, the battalion's senior enlisted soldier. Soldiers were trained to continue in their mission after combat. The battalion s command and staff group experienced "remarkably little turbulence." According to McChrystal, "this stability was absolutely a factor in the battalion's ability to cope with the tragedy." Most casualties were from the enlisted and noncommissioned officer ranks and included many sergeants. Despite losses, the battalion retained its unit cohesiveness and teamwork.
On 6 April, two weeks after the accident, McChrystal's and Austin s battalions were the f*st two units to jump in an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE), a large, complex maneuver that involved thirty-five Air Force aircraft and sixty helicopters. According to General Steele, the battalions were "right back into what they are here forwhat they are in the Army for." Participating in the exercise helped e soldiers to move beyond the tragedy.
The installation EOC and Womack EOC remained open for nearly a week following the Green Ramp disaster. They shut down on 29 March, the day of the memonal service. The division EOC at Womack continued to operate twenty-four hours a day for about five days. After the patients were consolidated and moved up to Ward 6A, the relocated to the ward and stayed there until about 8 April. From then on Colonel Stansfield coordinated assistance to families and monitored the status of patients from his office at division headquarters.
To heal emotional wounds, Fort Bragg's mental health professionals conducted formal debriefings. Strong emotional reactions to abnormal situations, psychiatrists believed were best handled by people talking about their experiences with others who had gone through the same thing. The 1985 air crash at Gander, Newfoundland, in which 236 members of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) perished had taught the Army that "it doesn't work to have people with different uniforms, with different patches, with . . . not knowing what' going on," conduct the debriefings, said Colonel Plewes, Womack's psychiatry and neurology chief. Hence, Fort Bragg used its own mental health resources, which were considerable. They included the 82d Airborne Division's mental health section; the 44th Medical Brigade's Medical Detachment (Combat Stress); the U.S. Army Special Forces Command; Womack's Department of Psychiatry and Neurology; and the 261st Medical Battalion (Area Support), with about six 91C mental health technicians. Although the 82d was primarily responsible for debriefing troops, other Fort Bragg mental health specialits and chaplains assisted. Womack's social workers and chaplains dealt primarily with family issues, and the nearby Rumbaugh Child and Adolescent Mental Health Clinic took care of the emotional needs of adolescents and children.
Formal critical incident stress debriefings began on the afternoon of 24 March. Four teams, consisting of two individuals each, met with the soldiers of the 2d and 4th Battalions, 504th Infantry, divided into small groups. The debriefings lasted between thirty and sixty minutes. Within seventy-two hours every soldier involved in the accident had attended at least one session. Debriefings continued on a daily basis for about a week. By then, the mental health specialists had debnefed forty-nine separate units and about 500 troops.
The debriefings were cathartic experiences, where the soldiers shared information about their location at the time of the crash, what they saw, and what they felt. Psychiatrists were able to differentiate between normal and abnormal reactions to trauma and identify those who were not coping well. The latter often were individuals who had experienced an earlier trauma but had never been debriefed, and thus the Green Ramp episode rekindled their pain. Psychiatrists also offered special counseling to soldiers who witnessed the accident and were not hurt, but who felt guilty for having been spared.
Therapy for the soldiers came in other forms as well. Colonel Plewes believed that the memorial service "shore[ed] up their mores, as it were." Ceremony and ritual also provided closure. Colonel McChrystal's personal therapy was to focus on the nearly 620 paratroopers in his battalion who were not killed and who needed a commander.
The psychiatrists decided to take the soldiers back to the crash site as therapy, especially since many expressed interest in returning to Green Ramp. Unit commanders and hospital nurses worked together to organize the effort. One week after the accident, the soldiers returned to Green Ramp. As far as Colonel Plewes could tell, no one was retrau matized. The paratroopers were supportive of one another and seemed to handle well the visit to the crash location.
Womack's mental health specialists took care of hospital staff Colonel Plewes gave top priority to debriefing emergency room and operating room personnel, followed by nurses on the wards that received the injured. Formal critical incident stress debriefings for hospital staff began two days after the accident. Psychologists emphasized the normalcy of the painful feelings and responses to a tragedy like Green Ramp. After attending a session, Major Light, who helped to tnage the casualties, shed her initial skepticism and reported, "Talking about what happened is crucial." Psychiatrists and hospital chaplains contacted pathologists conducting autopsies in the morgue to offer encouragement. Hospital custodial staff, who had cleaned up an excess of blood and debris after emergency treatment, also received debriefings one week after the incident.
The families of the victims received formal debriefings and individual counseling from chaplains and social workers at Womack's Weaver Conference Room or the family assistance activity in the Fort Bragg Community Center. Major Clark, the surgeon of the 82d, coordinated with the Rumbaugh Clinic on debriefings for adolescents and children because, according to Colonel Plewes, the division "likes to take care of its own." Counselors also visited the Fayetteville schools and allowed the youth to tell their classmates how they felt. Lt. Col Sherry Conner, a social worker, understood the healing process, stating that "adaption to catastrophic events comes in stages over time." Colonel Plewes reported that with each patient and family he tried to show that the accident, "while tragic, [was] just one event in the person's life."
Womack kept its outpatient psychiatric clinic opened on the weekend to conduct individual debriefings or perform crisis intervention Handouts on stress and trauma were available. Formal debriefings ended about one week after the accident, although counselors contined to be available for anyone who still needed to talk.
Chaplains directly immersed in the response were debriefed with those immediately involved on Green Ramp. Mental health specialrsts and chaplains in a support role talked to each other about the expenences during debriefing sessions, which was itself a form of debriefing. Colonel Plewes found it difficult to erase the memones of the casualties screaming when he tried to administer intravenous fluids into their burned skin. Talking about it helped him to process the experience.
Fort Bragg's mental health professionals, chaplains, and social workers had come together to help the Army community deal with the Green Ramp disaster. At "businesslike meetings" they divided up the work load and shared resources. Formal critical incident stress debriefings became "cooperative and multidisciplinary" undertakings, providing opportunities for psychiatric, social, and spiritual healing. Margaret Tippy remembered Colonel Plewes saying: "Everybody worked together," handling the emotional needs of people involved in the accrdent. Tippy added: "It wasn't personality driven. It wasn't ego driven. It was mission oriented and mission focused and that was wonderful."
The Green Ramp casualties who remained at Womack received medical care commensurate with their injuries, with most requiring physical therapy that usually commenced about twenty-four to thirty-six hours after injury. Col. Jack W. Briley, Womack's physical therapy chief, therefore, had a day to organize his response. He reviewed his burn slides from his burn lectures and had an in-service seminar on burn care, as well as a review of procedures and precautions, bloodtype transmission, and other techniques. With forty to sixty patients requiring hydrotherapy, wound cleaning, and wound healing, the physical therapy chief increased his burn teams from two to four and then to five, making use of enlisted assistants; obtained debriding mstruments, Silvadene, wrappings, gloves, gowns, goggles, and other supplies; and later expanded two occupational therapy stations to four, with occupational therapists and technicians on loan from the 28th Combat Support Hospital. Seeing inpatients in the mornings and outpatients in the afternoons, the therapists remained busy for several weeks and their supplies adequate. Colonel Briley, wondering whether a civilian medical facility could have handled the numbers he saw reflected on his successful response:
I think the experience of people being in the military and the military type of environment just teaches us how to react to these type of situations. Everybody pulled together. Everybody learned and the experience validated that we could do it. Our normal physical therapy load was very supportive of our demands.
By early April the Fort Bragg soldier patients, having completed a series of skin grafts and surgeries, started to return to Womack. The Department of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation at Womack provided follow-up care to the injured paratroopers on an outpatient basis coordinating the results of their visits with Major Mozingo at the USAISR burn unit or Dr. Peter Peterson at the Jaycee Burn Center. The rehabilitation staff made sure that the grafts remained complication free, without infections at the graft site or the donor site. To maintain range-of-motion and functional use of wrists and hands, patients received daily one-on-one therapy for one to two hours, but sometimes for only thirty to sixty minutes because of staff shortages, and also periodic remeasuring and fitting of compression garments to control swelling and facilitate the healing process. The department held an interdisciplinary burn clinic on Friday mornings in the basement of the clinical wing of the main hospital and consulted with surgery, orthopedics, occupational therapy, and other services on an individual patient basis.
Burned soldiers, except those with small superficial burns, "could expect to be on some type of physical profile for a minimum of one year," said Colonel Jones, Womack's deputy commander at the time of the accidnt. Most received health profiles authorizing limited duty obligations on a one- to three-month basis. Those with severe scarring and restricted motion might receive permanent duty limitations, depending on tht results of the healing process.
Unit cohesiveness had helped the Fort Bragg soldier patients to endure surgery, pain, and depression while undergoing trealment at the USAISR burn unit in San Antonio. They cheered each other up, refus ing to let anyone succumb to self-pity. Their efforts probably were instrumental in keeping alive one particular burn victim
Spc. Martin "Marty" R. Lumbert, Jr., of the 2d Battalion, 504th Infantry, was standing next to a short cement wall, topped by a chain link fence, when the crash occurred. Unable to outrun the fireball as it rolled through the staging area, he crouched down by the wall instinctively assuming a fetal position and covering his face with his hands. Within minutes he was on fire, with his back, legs, and hands burned severely.
Lumbert arrived in San Antonio on 30 March with the last group of Fort Bragg soldiers to leave Womack Army Medical Center. During the almost seven months he was at the USAISR burn unit, he received twenty-eight graftings, each one taking four to six hours to complete Because of the extent of his injuries on 88 percent of his body, his head was the only donor skin site. Additional suffering included amputations of both legs and all fingers; only part of his left thumb remained intact. Nevertheless, he learned to write and to feed himself, for his fellow soldier patients would not let him give up.
Hope Ramirez, Lumbert's mother and a registered nurse, was dissatisfied with the cleanliness of her son's room and the medical attention he received during the first few weeks. Concerned about infection, she complained to the USAISR staff about the cleanliness of his bed and its surroundings and the procedures used for treatment. Mrs. Ramirez liked the young doctor who treated her son, but was disappointed that he was not receiving one-on-one care from a more experienced burn specialist, considering his extensive injuries. She tried unsuccessfully to have him transferred to a private burn center in California, believing that he could receive the special medical attention warranted by his condition at a facility employing more modern techniques and having more up-to-date and sanitary wards than at the institute. Colonel Pruitt, the USAISR commander, refused to transfer Lumbert on the basis that he would not be able to grant the same request to other soldiers at the burn unit.
Ten percent of the burn victims' families complained about the procedures or the environment at the USAISR burn unit. They may have been angry and frustrated because their sons were so badly injured, and they could do little to help them other than to complaina way to handle stress, especially when a loved one is near death. Although 90 percent of the families seemed satisfied with the USAISR response, the complaints of Mrs. Ramirez and the other families became a matter of record in the treatment of the Green Ramp casualties.
The magnitude of this task cannot be overlooked. Pruitt's staff had to care for forty-three Fort Bragg soldier patients with second- and third-degree burns. The majority suffered burns on more than 15-45 percent of their bodies, one on 70 percent, and Lumbert on 88 percent of his body. Several also had traumatic body injuries, such as amputated limbs. The USAISR burn unit was understaffed and overworked during most of the treatment period. Staff members generally believed that their burn care was successful and that their procedures were consistent with accepted practice. As in most tense situations, explanationswhen time permiltedmight have helped to clarify perceptions on both sides.
Despite her criticism of the USAISR burn unit, Hope Ramirez was thankful to the Army for providing her with a place to live and for paying the first three months of rent until her husband, who had moved to San Antonio to be near his wife and stepson, found employment. She was pleased with the family support system at Fort Sam Hyuston, even though she remained displeased with some of the USAISR procedures.
The first Fort Bragg soldier patient was discharged from the USAISR burn unit on 4 April. By late June all but Lumbert had left thirty-four returning to duty, four transferring to rehabilitation facilities, and four going on convalescent leave. The Brooke Army Medical Center's emergency operations center closed down, and the Fort Sam Houston Family Assistance Center reverted to Army Community Services. In mid-July the USAISR plastic surgeons and occupational therapists visited Womack to evaluate the soldier patients and consult with specialists about reconstructive surgery. After this visit USAISR occupational and physical therapists continued to exchange information with their counterparts at Womack regarding the rehabilitation of the Fort Bragg paratroopers.
Specialist Lumbert remained at the USAISR burn unit until October, when he was transferred to a private rehabilitation center in San Antonio. He died on 3 January 1995 at a Methodist hospital near Fort Sam Houston. Lumbert's death brought to twenty-four the number of soldiers fatally injured in the disaster on Green Ramp.
 As quoted in Henry Cuningham, "Clinton visits Crash Survivors," Fayetteville Observer-Times, 26 Mar 94, p. A7.
 First quotation from Margaret Tippy, Information Paper to Health services Command PAO and Army PAO, 29 Mar 94, sub: After-Action Report on Womack Anmy Medical Center Public Affairs Activities Involving Injured Soldiers From Aircraft Crash (hereafter cited as Tippy Info Paper); second quotation from John Valceanu, "President visits Injured Soldiers,'' Paraglide (Fort Bragg, N.C.), 31 Mar 94, p. 3A. See also Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Patricia D. Horoho, 12 Apr 94.
 Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Gen William M Steele 20 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as Steele Interv).
 As quoted in Scott Yates, "Defense Chief 'Impressed' by Morale of Injured," Fayetteville Observer-Times, 30 Mar 94, p. 4A. See also Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Margaret Tippy, 14 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as Tippy Interv); Steele Interv, 20 Apr 94.
 Quotation from Tippy Interv, 14 Apr 94. See also Tippy Info Paper 29 Mar 94.
 Tippy Info Paper, 29 Mar 94.
 Steele Interv, 20 Apr 94.
 Henry Cuningham, "Fallen Soldiers Saluted," Fayetteville Observer-Times, 30 Mar 94, p. 4A; Martha Quillin, "Fort Bragg Service Honors 23 Dead," News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 30 Mar 94, p. 3A.
 Quillin, "Fort Bragg Service Honors 23 Dead," p. 3A.
 "They Came To Honor Their Dead," Fayetteville Observer-Times, 31 Mar 94 p. 3E.
 As quoted in Quillin, "Fort Bragg Service Honors 23 Dead," p. 3A. The 82d Airborne Division's official nickname is the All Americans, which derives from the fact that during World War I soldiers of the 82d came from all of the States.
 Ibid.; Cuningham, "Fallen Soldiers Saluted," p. 4A.
 Quillin, "Fort Bragg Service Honors 23 Dead," p. 3A.
 As quoted in Sean D Naylor, "Driving On: Battalion Honors Its Dead, Braces for Action, Army Times, 11 Apr 94, p 14. See also Steele Interv, 20 Apr 94.
 As quoted in Henry Cunningham, "Battalion Remains Ready to Fight Despiet Crash Losses, Leader Says," Fayetteville Observer-Times, 31 Mar 94, pp. 1A, 4A.
 First quotation given in ibid., p. 4A; second quotation from Naylor, "Driving On," p[. 12. See also Interv, Maj Christopher G. Clark with Col John Marcello, 11 Apr 94.
 As quoted in Naylor, "Driving On," p. 12.
 Steele Interv, 20 Apr 94. The EDREs are part of the XVIII Airborne Corps' ongoing training program to maintain its ability to deploy an airborne task force into combat without prior notice.
 Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Lt Col Randy Stansfield, 12 Apr 94.
 Quotation from Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Lt Col John W. Plewes, Maj Steve Knorr and Maj Michael L. Russell, 13 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv). Knorr was a psychiatrist in the 82d Airborne Division, and Russell was Womack's psychological services chief. See also Michael L. Russell, "Psychological Response to Green Ramp Incident," n.d., pp. 3-4. The U.S. Army Center of Military History has in its custody a collection of documents on the Gander crash.
 Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94; Russell, "Psychological Response," p. 16.
 Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94; Ruth Sheehan, Many Crash Survivors Suffer Severe, Life-Threatening Burns," News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), 25 Mar 94, p. 16A.
 Naylor, "Driving On," p. 13; Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, p. 13; Lt Col Iris J. West with Lt Col Stanley A. McChrystal, 22 Apr 94.
 Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94.
 Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with Maj Dawn Light, 21 Apr 94 (hereafter cited as Light Interv); Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13Apr 94; Memo, Maj Keith I. Jones, Chaplain, WAMC, to Chaplain, U.S. Army Medical Command, Fort Samm Houston, Tex., 6 Apr 94, sub: WAMC MASCAL AAR.
 First quotation from Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94; second and third quotations as given in Sheehan, "Many Crash Survivors," p. 16A. See also Light Interv, 21 Apr 94; Interv, Lt Col Iris J. West with S Sgt Michael T. Kelley and Mrs. Lisa Kelley, 25 May 94.
 Plewes, Knorr, and Russell Interv, 13 Apr 94.
 First two quotations from Russell, "Psychological Response," p. 10; third and fourth quotations from Tippy Interv, 14 Apr 94.
 Interv, Maj Christopher G. Clark with Col Jack W. Briley, 14 Apr 94.
 Ibid. Memo, Maj James R. Brown, Chief, Occupational Therapy, WAMC, to Dep Cdr for Ciinical Services, WAMC, 4 May 94, sub: Pope Air Force Base Mass Casualty; Memo, Carolyn MacDonald, Chief, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, WAMC, to Dep Cdr for Clinical Services, WAMC, 12 May 94, sub: Occupational Tlerapy Support of MASCAL Patients; Memo, Maj James R. Brown to Dep Cdr for Clinical Services, WAMC, 10 Jun 94, sub: PAFB Mass Casualty Patients.
 Memo, Col Stephen L. Jones, Dep Cdr for Clinical Services, WAMC, to Unit Cdrs, 9 Jun 94, sub: Medical Care for MASCAL Burn Patients.
 Telephone Interv, Mary Ellen Condon-Rall with Hope Ramirez, 26 Oct 95 (hereafter cited as Ramlrez Interv). Ramirez is the mother of Specialist Lumbert
 Ibid.; Interv, Mary Ellen Condon-Rall with Sgt Christopher J. Burson, Sgt. Jacob T. Naeyaert, Jr., and Spc Michael P. Fletcher, 2 Aug 95.
 Ramirez Interv, 26 Oct 95.
 Casualty List, Patient Administration Division, BAMC, I Apr 9l, sub: Status of Fort Bragg Burn Patients.
 Ramirez Interv, 26 Oct 95.
 After-Action Report, U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research, n.d., sub: Response to Pope AFB Accident, p. 11.
 Rarnirez Interv, 26 Oct 95.